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CELIA ANDERSON MADE A PRIMA FACIE 
SHOWING OF JURISDICTIONAL FACTS 
This Court's legal analysis was as follows: 
We hold that she [Celia Anderson] need only have 
made a prima facie showing that the trial court had 
personal jurisdiction over defendant in order to 
proceed to trial on the merits. Because the facts 
on which personal jurisdiction over defendants is 
asserted overlap the facts that will determine 
whether defendants are liable to Anderson, it was 
[not]1 proper for the trial court to rule on 
personal jurisdiction based only on documentary 
evidence. 
Anderson v. American Assn. of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, 
et al., 148 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1990). 
The Petition for Rehearing does not attack this Court's 
legal conclusion as stated above. Rather, the Petition only 
challenges the facts, and how those facts apply to the legal 
conclusions. 
Thus, the Petition for Rehearing argues that: 
Dr. Goldwyn submitted an Affidavit of Jurisdic-
tional Facts . . . which remains uncontroverted by 
plaintiff. Likewise the ASPRS submitted a similar 
Affidavit of Jurisdictional Facts . . . which also 
remain uncontroverted. 
(Petition for Rehearing at p. 7 — Emphasis added.) 
]It appears that the word not was left out of the text by 
clerical error. Rehearing should be granted for the sole purpose 
of correcting that oversight. 
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In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. Celia 
Anderson vigorously challenged those self-serving affidavits.2 
See generally R. 1613-1616 and R. 1655-1660 and Substitute Brief of 
Appellant p. 2-10. 
Specifically, Celia Anderson made a prima facie showing 
of jurisdictional facts. Each of Celia Anderson's jurisdictional 
facts is firmly grounded in the record. Listed below are the 
jurisdictional facts, as set forth in this court's opinion, 
together with the appropriate citation to the record: 
1. Celia Anderson should not have been accepted into 
the program as she did not fit the program's patient profile. 
Rathjen depo., R. 1812, Exhibit 3, p. 25; Leonard depo., R. 1811, 
p. 70; Goldwyn depo., R. 1810, pp. 30-34. Compare Appellant's 
Reply Brief pp. 5-6. 
2. Goldwyn1s responsibility was to make sure that all 
patients admitted to the program fit the protocol. Rathjen's 
Petitioners Goldwyn and ASPRS seem to argue that Celia 
Anderson could only challenge the affidavits of ASPRS and Goldwyn 
by filing a counter-affidavit. It is true that Celia Anderson did 
not file a counter-affidavit. Rather Celia Anderson chose to rely 
on deposition testimony as well as documents produced through 
discovery. Compare Rule 56 U.R.C.P. (,!The judgement sought shall 
be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits if any, show that there is no issue as to any material 
fact. . ,lf) (Emphasis added.) 
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letter, 1/7/77, R. 1628. Compare Substitute Appellant's Brief, p. 
5. 
3. ASPRS participated in the program with Dow Corning 
as a cosponsor. Rathjen depo., R. 1812, pp. 0.101, 101-102; ASPRS 
minutes, R. 1669, 4/18/77. Compare Appellant's Reply Brief pp. 13-
14, 21 and Substitute Appellant's Brief pp. 2-4. 
4. Both ASPRS and Dow Corning may have violated duties 
imposed by federal drug law. Rathjen depo., R. 1812, Exhibit 4, p. 
26; see also, R. 1608. Compare Appellant's Reply brief p. 5. 
5. Dow Corning and Dr. Goldwyn all participated in 
preparing the consent form. Rathjen depo., R. 1812, p. 106; Id, 
Exhibit 8, p. 4, item 12. Compare Appellant's Reply Brief at pp. 
10, 16 and Substitute Appellant's Brief pp. 3-4. 
6. A committee of ASPRS selected Salt Lake City as a 
program site. ASPRS minutes 3/24/77, R. 1670. Compare Appellant's 
Reply Brief pp. 17-18. 
7. A committee of APSRS selected Woolf as a program 
physician. Rathjen depo, R. 1812, p. 102; Goldwyn depo., R. 1810, 
pp. 60, 116; Woolf depo., R. 1813, pp. 6-7. Compare Substitute 
Appellant's Brief pp. 8-9. 
8. ASPRS assisted in preparing the consent form which 
it knew would be used in Utah. Rathjen depo., R. 1812, p. 102. 
Compare Substitute Appellant's Brief p. 9. 
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9. ASPRS with Dow Corning selected Dr. Goldwyn as 
medical monitor which included anticipated treatment in Utah. 
Rathjen depo., R. 1812, Exhibit 7, p. 2, item G; Id, Exhibit 8, p. 
2, items 4e and 8a. 
10. ASPRS investigated the potential for malpractice 
claims, including those that might arise in Utah. Rathjen depo., 
R. 1812, Exhibit 7, p. 6, item 13. 
11. ASPRS trained Dr. Woolf knowing that he would use 
that training in Utah. Rathjen's letter, R. 1628, para. 11; 
Goldwyn depo., R. 1810, pp. 60-62o Compare Appellant's Reply Brief 
p. 10 and Substitute Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-8. 
12. Goldwyn helped draft the consent form. Rathjen 
depo., R. 1812, p. 106. Compare Appellant's Reply Brief p. 10. 
13. Goldwyn supervised the proper administration of the 
treatment program in Utah. Rathjen depo., R. 1812, Exhibit 3, p. 
32; Rathjen's letter, R. 1628, para. 3. Compare Appellant's Reply 
Brief pp. 8-9. 
14. Goldwyn authorized Celia Anderson's silicone 
injections. Goldwyn depo., R. 1810, pp. 30-34, 110-111; Goldwyn 
letter, 4/19/78, R. 1652. Compare Appellant's Reply Brief p. 6 and 
Substitute Appellant's Brief pp. 6-7. 
15. Goldwyn assumed responsibility to monitor Celia 
Anderson's treatment and to follow up if there were problems. 
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Rathjen's letter 1/7/77, R. 1628. Compare Substitute Appellant's 
Brief pp. 5-7. 
In summary, there was no reason to file a counter-
affidavit. Instead, Celia Anderson relied on deposition and 
documentary evidence. Based upon such deposition and documentary 
evidence Celia Anderson made a prima facie showing of fifteen 
jurisdictional facts (above). Because these jurisdictional facts 
are entwined with the merits, a trial court judge should not decide 
jurisdiction. Rather the case should proceed for a trial on the 
merits. As this Court has concluded: 
Because the facts supporting jurisdiction overlap 
the facts supporting liability, the trial court 
must allow defendants to renew their motion to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction at the close of 
Anderson's evidence. 
14 8 Utah Adv. Rptr. p. 5. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD ALLOW ATTORNEY FEES 
FOR VIOLATION OF THE CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL 
As required by Rule 35(a) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
petitioners certified that the Petition for Rehearing was presented 
"in good faith and not for purposes of delay.11 (See Petition for 
Rehearing p. 12). 
However the substance of the Petition for Rehearing is 
merely a rehash of factual arguments. Specifically, ASPRS and 
5 
Goldwyn ask this court to rule, as a matter of law, that their 
version of the facts, their interpretation of the facts, and their 
inferences from those facts are correct. 
For example, ASPRS and Goldwyn argue that: 
The only conceivable relationship between ASPRS and 
the State of Utah arises from the fact that out of 
approximately 2,600 active members of the society, 
3 0 members reside in this state. 
(Petition for Rehearing p. 11.) 
That statement simply ignores Celia Anderson's prima 
facie showing to the contrary. See paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10, 11 above. 
Furthermore, ASPRS and Goldwyn argue that: 
Dr. Goldwyn1s only relationship with the State of 
Utah is an attenuated monitoring function and 
limited correspondence with Dr. Woolf arising out 
of either Anderson or her physician's unilateral 
monitoring function. 
(Petition for rehearing p. 12.) 
That statement simply ignores Celia Andersonfs prima 
facie showing to the contrary. See paragraphs 2, 5, 9, 12, 13, 14, 
15 above. 
After full briefing, and full argument, this Court has 
told ASPRS and Goldwyn (in a very well-reasoned opinion) that a 
jury would have to decide between those two competing versions of 
fact. There is no basis—absolutely none—for ASPRS and Goldwyn to 
6 
again ask this Court, at this late stage of the litigation, to 
accept one version of the facts over another version. 
If this Court chooses to allow attorney fees, the case 
should be remanded to the trial court for a factual determination 
of the amount thereof. See Porco v. Porco, 752 P. 2d 3 65 (Utah App. 
1988) . 
DATED this //y day of January, 1991. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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